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Introduction 
Volkswagen is renowned as a global powerhouse in the automobile industry. The 
automaker commanded 12% of global market share in 2017, touting internationally recognized 
brands including Audi, Lamborghini, and Porsche (Volkswagen Group deliveries, 2017). Its 
success has been in part due to an ambitious strategy called “Strategy 2018”. Launched by 
then-CEO Martin Winterkorn in 2007, Strategy 2018 focused on three aspects: increasing annual 
unit sales, improving quality and customer satisfaction, and strengthening VW’s position as a top 
employer. To distinguish itself, Volkswagen leveraged its “attractive and environmentally 
friendly” automobiles, advertising “clean diesel” technology and other innovations 
(Blackwelder, “The Volkswagen Scandal”, 2018, p. 5). 
In 2013, the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) contracted scientists 
from West Virginia University to conduct a routine emission test on three diesel vehicles, 
including the Volkswagen Jetta and Passat. While conducting emission measurements on the 
road, the scientists discovered that the Volkswagen vehicles emitted 35 times more NOx than 
U.S. regulations (Schiermeier, “​The science behind the Volkswagen emissions scandal.”,​ 2015).  
This anomalous result prompted international scrutiny into Volkswagen’s practices, 
revealing that Volkswagen was using sophisticated software to deceive regulators of the amount 
of nitrogen oxides (NOx) emitted by its diesel vehicles. NOx emissions are a major issue, linked 
to lung damage and diseases such as lung cancer or bronchitis. Furthermore, the pollutant can 
aggravate existing heart disease, leading to fatalities from cardiac arrest (Oldenkamp, “Valuing 
the human health damage [...]”, 2016). 
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This paper offers an ethical analysis of the actions of Volkswagen’s employees and 
management in the Volkswagen emissions scandal. This case study is important because it 
illustrates how obsessively growth-minded company cultures may compromise important 
engineering design decisions, especially in the face of strong economic and political duress for 
the company. It also highlights the potential for powerhouse companies like Volkswagen to 
refuse acknowledging existing faults, jeopardizing the trust of consumers and government 
regulators in the process. Volkswagen’s cultural environment condoned an attitude of unethical 
self-interest, encouraging the cheating of emissions regulations and the mischaracterization of 
Volkswagen vehicles as environmentally friendly. Although Volkswagen has since attempted to 
rectify this attitude, placing a greater emphasis on ethical conduct in the workplace, more needs 
to be done to enforce ethical decision making in the company. 
We use the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers Code of Ethics and the 
Volkswagen Group Code of Conduct to objectively evaluate Volkswagen’s actions. We consider 
the former because the scandal revolves around software designed by electrical and computer 
engineers, and the latter in order to evaluate the change in conduct within Volkswagen post 
scandal. Tenets found in each code, such as Tenet Three in the IEEE Code of Ethics, “To be 
honest and realistic in stating claims or estimates based on the available data,” are pertinent to 
the scandal and will prove consequential in developing a thorough case for or against 
Volkswagen’s conduct (“IEEE Code of Ethics,” n.d.). 
This paper begins with the chronological development of the company during Strategy 
2018. It describes the events that led to allegations of Volkwagen cheating on emissions testing, 
followed by an examination of the Volkswagen scandal’s fallout, and the actions taken by 
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Volkswagen to improve corporate culture. Finally, the paper discusses the various ethical 
violations of the Code of Conduct committed by Volkswagen’s engineers and management and 
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Martin Winterkorn Outlines a New Plan, and a New Volkswagen 
In 2007, Volkswagen’s new CEO, Martin Winterkorn, laid out a new plan called 
“Strategy 2018”. His vision was to make Volkswagen the number one automaker in the world, 
overtaking General Motors and Toyota. This plan would set the company culture and mindset in 
the years leading up to the scandal.  
Volkswagen Launches Strategy 2018 
Winterkorn highlighted several points on how to increase the sales on Volkswagen’s 
brands in key areas such as the U.S., Russia, and China (Muller, “How Volkswagen Will Rule 
the World”, 2013). Among them, his defining policy, “Strategy 2018,” outlined a need to 
increase customer satisfaction through better innovation and quality, achieve a consistent profit, 
and become the top employer across all brands to recruit engineers for enhancing innovation 
(Blackwelder, 2018, p. 2). 
Specifically, Winterkorn wanted to increase sales by more than 10 million vehicles per 
year through quality and customer satisfaction. Increasing sales would provide the company 
financial security during difficult times. Due to the decline in the European automobile market, 
Volkswagen needed to focus on increasing sales in profitable regions like the U.S., China, and 
Russia.​ ​Volkswagen also planned to become a top employer across all fields by attracting 
talented individuals who will help ensure the long term quality of Volkswagen’s innovations and 
technology (Blackwelder, 2018, p. 2). Consequently, Volkswagen employees increased by 
almost 50% from 2008 to 2012. (​“Volkswagen 2012 Annual Report", 2012​).  
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Volkswagen Charms the Public to Expand and Gain Recognition Overseas 
To achieve its sales goals, Volkswagen engaged in a large public campaign to improve its 
public image. In 2010, Volkswagen launched its “Think Blue” campaign in Europe, which was 
“intended to educate the masses about eco-friendly practices that can be applied in daily life” 
(Stoklosa, “Volkswagen Unveils ‘Think Blue’ [...]”, 2011). The following year, Volkswagen 
obtained the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) certification at their new 
factory in Chattanooga, Tennessee, signifying that the factory met environmental standards and 
was equipped to reduce waste. Additionally, Volkswagen partnered with the Museum of Modern 
Art to increase its involvement in social and cultural issues (Kurylko, “VW launches Think Blue 
[...]”, 2011). 
Volkswagen also launched a series of commercials advocating for their new “clean 
diesel” technology. In 2009, Volkswagen launched a “Truth or Dare” initiative, debunking diesel 
myths on television. The company also aired advertisements to promote diesel vehicles 
(Pemberton, “VW’s Clean Diesel Ads [...]”, 2015). As a result, the Volkswagen Jetta received 
the “Green Car of the Year” award in 2009. Volkswagen’s diesel vehicles seemingly met the 
U.S. standards, providing an alternative to the pricey hybrids of its competitors. The growing 
popularity of Volkswagen “clean diesel” vehicles enabled Volkswagen to successfully establish 
a foothold in the American automarket (Groom & Krolicki, “Volkswagen diesel car wins ‘Green 
Car of the Year’”, 2008). 
Implications on Corporate Culture 
To meet the ambitious goals of Strategy 2018, the employees were forced to adapt to a 
new corporate culture. The executives and management became increasingly aggressive about 
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goals and deadlines, pressuring workers and engineers to produce results more efficiently. This 
attitude created an environment well known for “eschewing debate and dissent,” creating a 
cutthroat and autocratic work environment. It caused workers to remain quiet about questionable 
company decisions in “fear of being excluded from the company’s generous bonus system” 
(Rhodes, “Democratic Business Ethics [...]”, 2016, p. 1511). 
 
Volkswagen Steers Itself into a Precarious Situation 
In 2013, the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) commissioned a study 
from West Virginia University (WVU) to measure three diesel cars’ emissions as part of a larger 
campaign to investigate on-road emissions compliance from a broad set of vehicles (Franco, 
Sánchez, German, and Mock, 2014, p. 2). WVU subsequently discovered emissions violations 
from two Volkswagen vehicles, prompting the California Air Resources Board (CARB) and the 
EPA to lead probes into Volkswagen and accuse them of evading regulations. 
Volkswagen Discovered Cheating Emissions Regulations 
The team at West Virginia University utilized portable emissions measurement systems 
(PEMS) in order to conduct on road testing of diesel vehicles. According to the researchers’ 
report, the use of PEMS allowed for the comparison of different emissions control systems in 
regards to nitrogen oxides against standards set by the EPA and CARB. The  researchers 
investigated emissions output across a wide variety of road conditions, in contrast to the 
laboratory settings of compliance testing (​Thompson, et al., "In-Use Emissions Testing of 
Light-Duty Diesel Vehicles [...]", 2014, p. ii​). 
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The results of WVU’s study provided an unexpected conclusion: real-world testing of the 
vehicles produced NOx emissions exceeding the EPA Tier 2 Bin 5 standard of .07 grams per 
mile for full useful vehicle life, by up to 35 times for the Volkswagen Jetta, and up to 20 times 
for the Volkswagen Passat (Thompson, et al., p. 106). The report was deferred to the EPA and 
CARB, who then conducted independent tests to verify the anomalous data. The two institutions’ 
subsequent investigations discovered that the scope of emissions noncompliance consistently 
spanned a wide range of vehicles listed in Table 1 (Brooks, “Re: Notice of Violation”, 2015), 
suggesting that this issue was unlikely to be caused by ignorance. 
 
In November 2015, the EPA issued a formal Notice of Violation (NOV) regarding the 
Clean Air Act of 1963 to Volkswagen. The EPA asserted that Volkswagen had knowingly and 
purposefully designed defeat devices to reduce NOx emissions during regulatory testing in order 
to bring vehicles to market (“EPA, California Notify Volkswagen of Clean Air Act Violations”, 
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2015). Almost half a million cars were suspected to be affected, and both EPA and CARB 
determined that Volkswagen was violating federal and state law (Hebert, "Re: Admission of 
Defeat Device [...]", 2015, p. 3). 
Defeat Devices explained.​ According to the 1963 Clean Air Act, section 203, ​Prohibited 
acts​, a defeat device is a  
component intended [...] to bypass, defeat, or render inoperative any device or 
element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine in 
compliance with regulations[.] (Clean Air Act, 1963, sec. 203) 
The defeat device in Volkswagen’s case was software that allowed the car to detect 
whether it is in a lab environment or on the road. Figure 1 provides an illustration of how the 
software operates. 
When the “switch” software detected that the car was in a laboratory setting using the 
factors shown in Figure 1, the car switched to what Volkswagen called “dyno-calibration”. 
Dyno-calibration used a NOx capture system, utilizing diesel fuel or urea to purge the NOx from 
vehicle exhaust and significantly reducing emissions (see Appendix A for a further discussion on 
NOx capture systems). However, when the software detected that the car was not being tested, it 
switched to “road-calibration”, in which the vehicle stopped injecting fuel/urea into the NOx 
capture system, rendering it useless (Brooks, p. 4). This decreased fuel consumption and 
promoted efficiency, but increased NOx emissions (Gates, Ewing, Russell, & Watkins, 2017).  
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Volkswagen Denies Allegations of Cheating 
Volkswagen asserted that the emissions anomalies “could be attributed to various 
technical issues and unexpected in-use conditions” (Brooks, p. 4). However, given the 
comprehensive test results, Volkswagen’s excuses provided insufficient explanation for their 
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vehicular noncompliance. Volkswagen attempted to resolve the problem by providing a software 
fix; however, the fix failed to placate regulators and resulted in a full recall (Herbert, p. 2).  
Additionally, well before the issuance of the Notice of Violation, it appears that 
Volkswagen had been consistently misrepresenting the state of its vehicles to regulators. 
According to a plea agreement for James Robert Liang, a key engineer of the defeat devices, 
Liang and other engineers lied to officials during certification meetings about the existence of 
defeat devices and the compliance of their vehicles (Department of Justice, "Volkswagen 
Engineer Pleads Guilty [...]", 2016). 
After the admission of guilt, Volkswagen management attempted to distance themselves 
and the company from the scandal by blaming a handful of engineers. “When ​Der Spiegel 
reported that ‘at least 30 people’ were implicated in the scam, Volkswagen responded by saying 
that this assertion was ‘completely without basis’” (Rhodes, p. 1511). In December of 2015, 
Chairman Hans Poetsch accused a “very limited group that acted irresponsibly”, and denied 
involvement of upper management in the development of the defeat devices (Cremer, "VW Says 
Only Small Group to Blame [...]", 2015). 
 
New Leadership Attempt to Chart a New Course for Volkswagen 
After the scandal, Volkswagen was forced to recall and repair millions of vehicles 
globally. The scale of the scandal was massive: 11 million cars worldwide were found to have 
defeat devices installed, of which about 500 thousand were sold in the United States. 
Volkswagen was heavily impacted financially, and the public health and environment declined 
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from the vehicle pollution. Since the scandal, Volkswagen, under new leadership, has worked to 
reorient company ethics and policy, with mixed results. 
Impacts of the Scandal on Both Volkswagen and the Public 
In May 2019, VW CFO Frank Witter disclosed that the scandal has cost Volkswagen 
around $30 billion in buybacks, legal settlements, and government reparations. This cost 
includes a $4.3 billion penalty to the federal government (Department of Justice, "Volkswagen 
AG Agrees to Plead Guilty [...]", 2017) and a $14.7 billion corporate settlement with the FTC 
and American consumers ("Volkswagen to Spend Up to $14.7 Billion to Settle Allegations [...]", 
2016).  
However, these costs exclude the monetary impact caused by the dissolution of consumer 
trust. A study published in July 2019 by Ruediger Bachmann, et al. found that the German auto 
industry was impacted by the fallout, shedding $5.2 billion in sales in 2016 (“Firms and 
Collective Reputation: a Study of the Volkswagen Emissions Scandal”, 2019). 
Additionally, Volkswagen’s vehicles adversely affected public health and the 
environment. A study by Chossiere et al. determined that the fleet of cars with defeat devices 
will cause about 1200 premature deaths in Europe and cost 1.9 billion Euros ("Public Health 
Impacts [...]", 2017, p. 1). Diane Alexander and Hannes Schwandt demonstrated that a “10 
percent cheating-induced increase in car exhaust increases rates of low birth weight and acute 
asthma attacks among children by 1.9 and 8.0 percent, respectively” ("The Impact of Car 
Pollution on Infant [...], 2019). Tanaka et al. determined that the scandal will produce a 
proportionally larger impact to the climate in the short term compared to compliant vehicles 
("Climate Effects [...]", 2018, pp. 5-6). 
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Volkswagen Changes Policy and Develops a More Sustainable Organization 
In the immediate wake of the scandal, Volkswagen’s new CEO, Matthias Muller, was 
brought in to replace Winterkorn and perform damage control. Muller sought to reorient the 
company by presenting his Strategy 2025. In the new plan, several key initiatives stand out: 
making Volkswagen’s role for the environment and safety a top priority, focusing on electrifying 
its vehicles, and reorganizing the company’s framework to encourage innovation, 
entrepreneurship, and change (Strategy TOGETHER 2025, 2019).  
Accordingly, Volkswagen has pledged up to $66.3 billion to facilitate electric and hybrid 
vehicle development within the next decade ("Volkswagen to spend €60 billion on switch to 
electric cars", 2019). Hiltrud Dorothea Werner was appointed to the management of integrity and 
legal affairs in 2017, where she has overseen the overhaul of the Volkswagen Group Code of 
Ethics. Volkswagen has introduced a whistleblower support program, revised its ethics training, 
and created an extensive integrity and compliance program Together4Integrity (T4I) (Strategy 
TOGETHER 2025, 2019). 
 
Ethical Analysis of the Actions by the Engineers and Management at Fault 
Since Liang’s group developed the cheating software back in 2006, Volkswagen has 
violated numerous tenets of the IEEE Code of Ethics (Department of Justice, 2016). In 
particular, Volkswagen acted unethically by developing defeat devices, endangering the public 
and environment (Tenets 1 and 9) and by mischaracterizing the regulatory compliance of its 
vehicles to regulators, customers, and shareholders (Tenets 3 and 7). Consequently, Volkswagen 
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has needed to make a significant effort to turn around the corporate culture and make the 
workplace more transparent. 
Violations of IEEE Code of Ethics Tenet 1 and 9 
The eventual admission by Volkswagen to authorities that it had devised defeat devices 
to evade regulatory scrutiny shows that Volkswagen was complicit in a conspiracy to evade the 
law. In doing so, the engineers responsible for the defeat devices were also complicit in not 
upholding the IEEE Code of Ethics, in particular Tenet 1, shown in Table 2. As explored by 
Chossiere et al. and Tanaka et al., the Volkswagen scandal created a massive loss of life and 
property and contributed to the deterioration of the environment and the climate. These effects, 
which will be long lasting and widespread, violate Tenets 1 and 9. 
 
Although it is plausible that Liang and co. did not fully consider the repercussions of 
using a defeat device, it was evident that company culture coerced engineers to design said 
device despite rigorous evidence of the harmful effects of NOx emissions. The engineers and 
management were enabling unethical actions instead of delaying the entry of Volkswagen 
vehicles into the American market. In hindsight, the cost of said delay would be a pittance in 
comparison to the long term costs borne by the company as a result of the scandal today. 
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Violations of IEEE Code of Ethics Tenet 3 and 7 
Through the denial of fault, shifting of blame, and misrepresentation of its cars, 
Volkswagen and its engineers, including the upper management, violated IEEE Code of Ethics 
Tenets 3 and 7, listed in Table 3. By violating these tenets, the engineers and management 
exposed themselves, Volkswagen, and the public to unnecessary risk had they valued safety over 
increased profitability. Despite the social and economic pressure Liang and co. were under, given 
that they “could not design a diesel engine that would meet the stricter U.S. emissions standards” 
(Department of Justice, 2016), their decisions should not be excused. By committing extensive 
fraud, the engineers failed to hold themselves to the highest ethical standards, and undermined 
the relationship between the public and the profession.
 
Additionally, practical incentives exist for abiding by the Code of Ethics. Following 
Tenet 3 would have protected the engineers from legal trouble and prevented the Volkswagen 
scandal entirely if they did not misrepresent their vehicles. If management had abided by Tenet 
7, most of the corporate directors, being engineers themselves, would have better prevented the 
resulting fallout if they were upfront about their shortcomings, instead of continuing to deny 
involvement until the issue was prolonged beyond repair.  
Ethics at Volkswagen Post-Dieselgate 
Since the scandal broke, it appears on the surface that Volkswagen has made substantial 
progress in improving its corporate culture. Alongside internal reforms, Volkswagen has worked 
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externally with the Independent Compliance Auditor (ICA) directed by Larry D. Thompson, who 
previously oversaw the federal investigation of the notorious Enron scandal (Thompson L. D., 
"First Annual Report [...]", 2018, p. 33), in order to address problem areas and emphasize proper 
conduct in the workplace. This is a step towards improving compliance with government 
regulations of customers, as stressed in their Code of Conduct.  
Included in this new Group Code of Conduct are various principles, such as product 
safety, environmental protection, integrity, transparency, and others (“Volkswagen Group Code 
of Conduct”, 2017). These principles attempt to guide Volkswagen employees in making 
decisions that minimize risk among stakeholders and promote an attitude that Volkswagen is 
making strong efforts to become a more upright company. 
However, attitudes at Volkswagen have yet to recover. Only 25% of employees surveyed 
“agree that corporate culture has improved” in 2018, three years after the scandal (Menzel, 
2018). While former top executives have been removed, others including CEO Herbert Diess and 
chairman Hans Dieter Potsch remain in power despite recently being charged by German 
authorities for market manipulation (Thompson, M., 2019). Recently, Diess made a faux pas 
using the phrase “earnings before interest and taxes set you free” in an earnings call, an 
unfortunate resemblance to the Nazi slogan “work sets you free” (Masters, 2019). These facts 
suggest that there exists a schism between the workers and upper management in terms of 
accountability and Volkswagen has not yet lived up to its tenets of transparency and integrity in 
the upper management. Volkswagen has not done enough to “hold executives accountable” 
(Ewing, "Volkswagen's Effort to Stop Scandals [...]", 2018), at a time when Volkswagen needs 
clear role models to direct the company. 
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Conclusion 
The Volkswagen scandal is arguably the largest emissions scandal in recent history. The 
scandal led to a massive release of NOx, contributing to the greenhouse gas effect, as well as 
increasing the chances of respiratory diseases and associated premature deaths. By engineering 
defeat devices to cheat the stricter emissions laws in the U.S., Volkswagen also jeopardized the 
trust of its consumers and regulators.  
The primary motivating factor in the development of defeat devices was the internal 
corporate pressure to make Volkswagen the world’s foremost automaker, an ambitious goal set 
during the “Strategy 2018” period by ex-CEO Martin Winterkorn. This plan led to management 
being increasingly willing to take shortcuts to increase profits in key markets like the U.S., 
forcing engineers to either find cheaper alternatives to address higher regulatory standards, or 
possibly lose their jobs. 
This case study shows that companies need to incorporate and enforce an established 
code of ethics into their work culture. Companies should always consider the ethical 
responsibilities of their engineers when developing business strategies such as “Strategy 2018” to 
prevent the prioritization of profit at the expense of the public. By incorporating a Code of Ethics 
into their decision making, companies are more likely to avoid scandals by shaping a culture that 
values safety and good design. Additionally, putting a greater emphasis on ethics could reduce 
potential costs from recalls and lawsuits.  
After observing the role of workers and management in the Volkswagen scandal, we ask: 
what should be the division of responsibilities between government, companies, and engineers to 
uphold ethical decision making? The Volkswagen scandal revealed a lack of accountability of 
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engineers and management to make ethical decisions. In contrast, the recent Boeing 737 MAX 
scandal revealed the failure of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to properly certify 
Boeing’s planes at the expense of safety. All three branches involved in developing and 
certifying new products can be culpable in endangering the public. Therefore, it may be up to the 
individual to be his/her own self-advocate and hold ethical decision making against each of these 
groups to a higher standard.  
 
Word Count: 4000 (Including Appendix A) 
  
VOLKSWAGEN EMISSIONS SCANDAL        20 
List of Abbreviations 
CARB California Air Resources Board 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CLD Chemiluminescence Detector 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
ICCT International Council on Clean Transportation 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 
LEED Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 
LNT Lean Nitrogen Oxide Trap 
NOV Notice of Violation 
NOx Nitrogen Oxides 
PEMS Portable Emissions Measurement System 
SCR Selective Catalytic Reduction 
T4I Together4Integrity 
VW Volkswagen 
WVU West Virginia University  
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Appendix A 
Discussion of NOx Capture Systems (LNT and SCR) 
It appears that Volkswagen, along with other auto companies, have been developing NOx 
capture systems such as LNT and SCR since at least 2006. Thompson et al. investigated two 
SCR systems and one LNT system (the BMW, Passat, and Jetta, respectively) during their study, 
in which both systems were complicit in the Volkswagen scandal (Thompson et al., p. ii). 
Lean NOx Traps, or NOx-storage catalytic converters or LNTs, use oxygen-rich chemical 
reactions to deposit NO onto a substrate as NOx. However, the substrate will eventually saturate, 
so it must be periodically purged using the reverse chemical reaction, which involves an 
abundance of fuel - in Volkswagen’s case, diesel (ICCT, p. 8). As a result of using fuel to scrub 
the substrate, LNTs are less fuel efficient in their operation than SCRs. 
Additionally, LNTs have another weakness: the substrates used are also very good 
absorbers of sulfur oxides, or SOx, and relatively bad at desorption. Therefore, fuels that contain 
more sulphur and sulphur products tend to reduce LNTs efficiencies and lifespans as their 
combustion products take away vital absorption area for NOx on the substrate ("LNT: SCR'S 
LITTLE BROTHER", 2017). 
In contrast, SCR, or Selective Catalytic Reduction, uses a catalyst, usually urea, to 
decompose NOx into N​2​ (nitrogen gas) and water (ICCT, p. 7). Although the byproducts of this 
reaction seem harmless, SCR has disadvantages in the fact that there is a need for extra storage 
and relevant piping and design controls to dispense and regulate urea doping. In comparison, 
LNT just uses the fuel itself and provides more leeway to the capacity and design of the car. 
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Both of these capture systems have advantages and disadvantages (particularly in the 
small car segment, in which LNT becomes less efficient as the vehicle size increases), making 
their use in the market mixed. However, that representation does not belie the fact that both are 
susceptible to emissions cheating. Software can be made to create different driving profiles, like 
uphill driving or winter driving, to increase fuel efficiency or smoothness of driving. By 
extension, it is not improbable that automakers make profiles for regulatory driving tests as well. 
